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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELIABLE FURNITURE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., 
WESTERN GENERAL AGENCY, and 
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
Defendants and Respondents. j 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11656 
This is an action filed in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County by plaintiff, Reliable Furniture Company, against de-
fedants American Home Assurance Co., Western General 
Agency and General Adjustment Bureau. At time of trial, Se-
curity Development Company, a corporation, and American 
Carpet Company, a corporation, were joined as involuntary 
plaintiffs. The action seeks to set aside an insurance settle-
ment under a business interruption policy, and to recover 
the actual loss sustained under the policy terms as well as 
accompanying damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The motion of each defendant for an involuntary dismis-
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sal at the close of plaintiff's case was granted by District Judge 
D. Frank Wilkins from the bench on March 20, 1969, after 
three days of trial before a jury. A formal judgment of dis-
missal was entered April 28, 1969, R-34. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of involuntary 
dismissal as to each defendant, and remand to the District 
Court for determination of all the issues by jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Presentation of appellant's case at trial entailed three 
days of testimony and twenty-three exhibits. Appellant will 
not set out in detail all the evidence, but will outline the basic 
facts relied upon to establish a jury question. 
Appellant will be referred to as "Reliable"; defendant 
American Home Assurance Co. as "American"; defendant 
Western General Agency as "Western"; and defendant Gen-
eral Adjustment Bureau as "GAB". 
Reliable is a Utah corporation, having conducted a fur-
niture operation at Ogden, Utah, from 1945 through May 
of 1962 at a location at 23rd and Washington. R 55, 110. It 
was a substantial operation, with some thirty-four full-time 
employees, and sales of just under one million dollars in 1959. 
R 62, 67. Sam Herscovitz, principal officer of Reliable, has 
been in the retail furniture business since 1934. R 55. 
In the morning hours of March 30, 1961, a fire of un-
known origin swept the Reliable store, causing extensive dam-
age to both the premises and the merchandise therein. R 81. 
Reliable at that time had a policy of insurance with 
Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance, (not a party to this suit) 
covering the stock, or inventory, and Reliable also was insur-
ed by defendant American under a "U & O", or business in-
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terruption policy. P-2, R 83. Defendant Western was the gen-
eral agent in Utah for both Fidelity and American, and de-
fendant GAB was assigned to adjust both the stock loss and 
the business interruption loss. R 245, 246, 83, 87. 
The inventory of damaged merchandise was completed 
and the amount of the stock loss ($84,000) under the Fidelity 
policy agreed upon by Reliable and GAB within one week af-
ter the fire. R 83, 84. The damage to the store was so extens-
ive the premises were not restored until July 20, 1961. R 91. 
In an attempt to reduce losses, Reliable opened its doors to 
dispose of some of the merchandise on May 15, forty-seven 
days after the fire. R 90. The store operation, due to the fire, 
repairs, disposing of merchandise and replacement of inven-
tory, did not return to a substantially normal position until 
October, six months after the fire. R 94. 
During the weeks after the fire, Reliable was engulfed 
by an increasingly serious need for money. R 85. This criti-
cal subject was discussed by Mr. Herscovitz at many times 
prior to June 19 with both GAB and Western. R 85, 86, 247, 
248. 
Despite this, Western did not receive authority from Fi-
delity to pay the stock loss until June 16, 1961, some ten 
weeks after Reliable and GAB had agreed on the $84,000 
figure. On that date, Jack Day, vice-president of Western, tele-
phoned Herscovitz he had authority to pay the claim if he 
would come down to Salt Lake. R 249. Herscovitz did go to 
Western's office that day, a Friday, but was then informed 
by Jack Day he wanted to settle the business interruption 
loss (American) at the same time. R 97. The adjuster on the 
American claim was not then available and despite the re-
quest of Herscovitz that Reliable be paid then for the stock 
loss, Day arranged for a meeting in Ogden the following Mon-
day, the 19th, to conclude the stock loss and the business in-
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terruption loss. R 98. 
The meeting was held in Herscovitz' office in the store 
on June 19, 1961, beginning at about 2:00 P.M. and lasting 
until about 6:30 P.M. Present were Herscovitz, William Ball, 
(adjuster for GAB), Day, and for a part of the time, Wayne Dyk-
stra, Reliable's bookkeeper. Day had with him the completed 
and signed $84,000 draft drawn on Fidelity and a blank draft 
drawn upon American. 
The adjuster, Ball, obtained figures from Dykstra and 
spent perhaps two hours on calculations pertaining to the 
business interruption loss. R 99. Eventually Ball arrived at 
a figure of $12,900 and proposed this to Herscovitz. Both Her-
scovitz and Dykstra expressed surprise and concern at the 
small figure (R 210) and Herscovitz then asked for payment 
of the stock loss only and for postponement of the business 
interruption settlement. R 100. At this point Jack Day, vice-
president of Western, told Herscovitz he would not be paid 
the stock loss payment ($84,000) unless he agreed to and 
signed the interruption loss settlement of $12,900. R 100, 211. 
Herscovitz then turned to Ball, GAB adjuster, and asked, "Is 
that the way it has to be?" Ball replied, "Yes, that's the way 
it has to be." R 101. Day further told Herscovitz at that time 
he was under instructions not to deliver the $84,000 draft 
unless the $12,900 release was signed. R 101. 
Herscovitz relied on these statements of Day and Ball 
(R 138) and in order to obtain the desperately needed mon-
ies, signed the release agreement and received both drafts at 
approximately 6:30 or 6:45. R 205. The $84,000 draft remain-
ed in Day's pocket from his arrival at 2:00 P.M. until 6:30 
P.M., when it was produced and delivered following execu-
tion of the $12,900 release. R 251. 
Reliable deposited the $84,000 draft the next morning, 
but held the $12,900 draft some eight or nine days until the 
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$84,000 draft had in fact been paid. R 106. During this pe-
riod, Herscovitz consulted with counsel and after doing so, 
endorsed and deposited the $12,900 draft. D 12, R 106. 
The American policy (P-2) provides, in general terms, 
indemnity for the reduction of gross earnings during the pe-
riod of business interruption. Reliable presented testimony 
of gross earnings during a four-month period and a six-month 
period following March 30, 1961, and compared such periods 
to the same periods of 1960, and also compared them to the 
same periods of time for the average of 1958, 1959 and 1960. 
This testimony established the reduction of gross earnings 
to be: 
Four months 1960 basis --·-·····-··········-··-$59,467.93 
Four months 3-year average ····----···-·· 61,739.96 
Six months 1960 basis ---····-···--·--·-·······-94,004.72 
Six months, 3-year average ··---·-······-··121,159.96 
R 115, 116, 179. Additional expenses attributable to the inter-
ruption in excess of $17 ,000 were established. R 107, 108. 
Herscovitz testified the loss to be at a minimum under the 
American policy of $128,000. R 152. 
Although Reliable kept its doors open until May of 1962, 
it could not survive after the disastrous fire and the action 
of defendants in withholding settlement of either claim for 
21/2 months and forcing Reliable to accept perhaps ten per-
cent of its actual interruption loss experience. R 110. 
Suit was filed August 11, 1961, shortly after the acts 
complained of. R 1. By leave of Court, two amendments to 
the complaint were filed, R 22, R 31. The relief sought is (1) 
setting aside the settlement of $12,900; (2) recovery of actual 
loss under the American policy; (3) attendant damages; ( 4) 
damages for fraud and misrepresentation. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
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MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DE-
FENDANT AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law the draft, D-12, 
constituted a complete release of any and all claims under 
the business interruption policy. R 35. 
It is interesting to note release is an affirmative defense 
that must be pleaded to be effective. U.R.C.P. 8(c). Defen-
dants have never pleaded the defense of release. R-7. No 
amendment to the answer was asked for or granted during 
trial. 
This Court, in an earlier appeal of this case, Reliable 
vs. American, et al, 16 Ut. 211, 398 P2 685, overturned a 
non-suit visited upon Reliable at pre-trial by the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett. In reversing, this Court set out the facts as claim-
ed by plaintiff and ruled these facts sufficient to have a jury 
pass upon the questions of duress and fraud: 
"If we accept the facts as plaintiff contends them to be, 
as we are obliged to do on this review, we must 
assume not only that the plaintiff was in economic dis-
tress, but that the defendant knew this and took ad-
vantage of him by falsely representing that money be-
longing to the plaintiff could not be delivered to him, 
and wrongfully refusing to deliver it unless plaintiff 
would also accept the proffered settlement on defen-
dant's policy, which resulted in compelling plaintiff 
to accept the latter settlement against his will. If found 
to be true, this false representation, coupled with the 
wrongful withholding of that which belonged to plain-
tiff, may well justify a finding of duress which would 
afford him relief from the settlement." 
A quick perusal of the facts set out in that opinion with 
the Statement of Facts supra shows they are parallel and sub-
stantially identical. How, then, did the trial court here differ-
entiate the evidence at trial from the opinion, with the end 
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result of Reliable being ejected from court a second time 
without benefit of jury? Apparently the difference exists sole-
ly in D-12, the $12,900 draft referred to in the Judgment. 
The document was not before this Court on the previous ap-
peal. 
Clearly, this is a distinction without a difference. This 
Court, on the previous appeal, had all of the facts surround-
ing the draft, its retention, consultation with counsel and even-
tual negotiation. 
To quote from Respondent's Brief on the last appeal, at 
Page Four they set out: 
"Herscovitz allegedly objected but then accepted a 
settlement in the sum of $12,609.39 which was made 
out at that time along with a proof of loss release 
which Herscovitz executed. He also accepted the $84,-
923.39 from Fidelity (D-68). Subsequently, Mr. Her-
scovitz consulted with counsel and presented both 
drafts for payment and accepted the proceeds (R 35)." 
(Underlining Added.) 
This point was developed and relied upon by Justice Henroid 
in his dissent in the earlier case, commenting, 
"In waiting nine days, cashing it and using the pro-
ceeds, does not bespeak a lack of mutuality in meas-
uring the length of the Chancellor's foot." 
D-12 contains printed language standard to such drafts. 
Under normal circumstances the paid draft would evidence 
a release. But the case Reliable presents to this Court is 
not a normal case. It is a case of fraud and duress compelling 
Reliable to accept a token settlement or face certain destruc-
tion from lack of funds. 
Admittedly, Herscovitz knew on June 19 that defendants 
were unfairly attempting to force a settlement on him. R 137. 
Knowledge of the fact of fraud or duress does not prevent 
7 
the injured party from asserting his rights thereafter. Buford 
vs. Lonergen, 6 U 301, 22 P 164. 
At what point in time or in activity does the conduct of 
the victim reach the stature it was here accorded, constitut-
ing release as a matter of law? According to 76 C.J.S. Re-
lease, Sec. 32, 
"It has been said that an extreme case is required 
before the application of the rule of ratification will 
be inferred from conduct, and that one should not be 
held to have adopted a release procured by fraud in 
the absence of an unequivocal act giving rise to the 
inference of an intent to ratify or unless reasonable 
minds would say that he was guilty of conduct tend-
ing to show an intention so to do." 
In the present action, Herscovitz testified he consulted 
counsel to determine his legal rights and thereafter deposit-
ed the check with no intention to accept or approve the set-
tlement. R 140. The Trial Court apparently took the view there 
were two transactions, related but separate and independent. 
These were (a) the June 19 agreement resulting in signing 
of the Proof of Loss, P-14, and (b) the endorsement and de-
posit, eight or nine days later, of the $12,900 draft, D-2. This 
is an arbitrary and unrealistic approach that completely emas-
culates the earlier Reliable opinion of this Court. 
A case very much in point is Purvis vs. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
198 F2d 631, 3rd C.C.A. In this case Purvis, an injured 
workman, signed a release to obtain his paycheck. In return 
he was given a check that contained a printed release para-
graph above the space for endorsement, just as the Ameri-
can draft in this case did. Purvis took the check elsewhere, 
endorsed and cashed it. The trial judge held there was suf-
ficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of setting aside 
the release, but he also reversed a judgment for Purvis on 
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a basis identical with the ruling of our Trial Court: The en-
dorsed check as a matter of law was a complete release. In 
reversing the District Court, the Third Circuit held there is 
no basis to separate the transactions, stating: 
"We agree with the district judge that the validity of 
the release, under the testimony, was properly a jury 
question but we are forced to disagree with the inter-
pretation of the endorsement of the check as an inde-
pendent act. It seems to us that the attempted disposal 
of the claim must be viewed as a whole - a single bus-
iness transaction. Admittedly the sole subject of the 
talk between Purvis and the claim agent was the pay-
ment of money by the railroad to Purvis. The latter 
says the money simply represented six days' pay. The 
railroad man asserts that the payment was primarily to 
obtain a release of all claims of Purvis stemming from 
his accident. Whatever be the fact as to that, unques-
tionably the railroad check was given in exchange for 
the release. It is that check which had the release lan-
guage on it above where Purvis endorsed it. Whether 
there was fraud in the obtainment of the release was 
held to be a jury question and rightly so. But as a prac-
tical matter this ruling was rendered completely in-
effectual by the trial court, deciding that the neces-
sary signature to the instrument received in exchange 
for the release constituted a new, unrelated proceed-
ing." 
This presents the crux of appellant's complaint. The en-
dorsed draft, D-2, cannot and should not be taken out of con-
text, isolated and evaluated solely on its content and the time 
of negotiation. To do so renders immaterial all evidence 
surrounding the transaction that produced the draft, the meet-
ing of June 19. Stated differently, appellant seeks to avoid the 
(singular) settlement of the American policy. Appellant has 
presented evidence sufficient, according to this court, to have 
a jury pass upon the question. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
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MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DE-
FENDANT WESTERN GENERAL AGENCY. 
The trial court entered Judgment (R 34) in favor of 
Western upon alternative grounds, 
(a) insufficient evidence to support a finding that plain-
tiff executed the release as a result of duress or coercion by 
Western; or 
(b) insufficient evidence to support a finding that Re-
liable relied to its detriment on any representation of West-
ern. 
The argument previously made as to defendant Ameri-
can is involved here, so this discussion will be limited to the 
narrow issues found by the trial court as to Western. The first 
finding by the Court relates to the economic duress allega-
tions of Reliable's complaint. The second, or alternative find-
ing is pertinent to the fraud and misrepresentation allegations 
of the complaint. 
As to (a) it is indeed difficult to reconcile this finding 
with the evidence. The sworn testimony of Herscovitz re-
veals he agreed to the settlement solely because it was the only 
way he could get the $84,000 stock loss payment. Again, these 
are not two seperate, isolated transactions, but one settlement 
resulting from the duress of defendants. Day, vice-president of 
Western, is the person who made the actionable statements 
to Herscovitz. 
(b) Deals with the fraud alleged in the amendment to 
the complaint of Reliable (R 31). The evidence is undisputed 
(R 138) that Herscovitz did indeed rely upon and believe the 
statements made by Day. As a result of such reliance and be-
lief, and the economic position it was in, Reliable was forced 
to accept the unfair settlement. That Herscovitz knew West-
ern was acting wrongfully, and consulted counsel with refer-
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ence to his rights, does not alter the fact of belief and reliance 
upon Day's statements. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DE-
FENDANT GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU. 
The questions of law here are identical to the Western 
argument; the only difference occurring in the identity of 
the malefactor. Ball, adjuster for GAB in charge of this inter-
ruption loss, was asked at the June 19 meeting by Hersco-
vitz if what Day had said was correct. He replied, "That's the 
way it has to be." R 101. Additionally, it should be noted that 
Ball was the person who calculated the settlement figure this 
entire lawsuit is about. By adopting and confirming the state-
ment of Day, Ball made GAB a principal in the wrongful acts 
complained of. It is not necessary to prove a person actually 
made the statement, if the proof shows he joined in or ap-
proved the statement of another. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud, Sec. 96. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUB-
MIT THE ISSUES OF FRAUD CONTAINED IN THE 
AMENDMENT TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT TO 
THE JURY AS TO EACH DEFENDANT. 
At pre-trial held June 5, 1968, plaintiff obtained leave 
of Court, Honorable Bryant H. Croft, to amend its complaint 
with particularity as to the fraud alleged. This was done by 
Amendment filed September 26, 1968, R 31, 33. The Amend-
ment alleged a cause of action bottomed in fraud, and rest-
ing upon the statements of Day and Ball previously set out 
in the Statement of Facts. 
The cause of action sounding in fraud is not determined 
by the validity of the release, it stands or falls on the proof 
by Reliable of the elements of Fraud as set out by this Court 
in Pace vs. Parrish, 122 U 141, 247 P2 273: 
"(1) That a representation was made; 
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(2) Concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) Which was false; 
(4) Which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insuffi-
cient knowledge upon which to base such rep-
resentation; 
( 5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
( 6) That the other party, acting reasonably and in ig-
norance of its falsity; 
(7) Did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) And was thereby induced to act; 
(9) To his injury and damage." 
The ultimate question in review of this point is not the 
release, but the showing of the above elements by admissable 
evidence of Reliable. The distinction is noted in 37 C.J.S. 
Fraud, Sec. 63, as 
"An action of deceit to recover damages for fraud in-
ducing the making of a contract is not based on the 
contract but on the tort, and the consummation of the 
contract does not shield the wrongdoer or preclude 
recovery of damages for the fraud. Even in the case 
of an executory contract the action for fraud is not on 
the contract, but is collateral thereto." 
Again, at 37 C.J.S. Fraud, Sec. 67, the rule is outlined: 
"Since an action for deceit, as noted supra Sec. 63, is bas-
ed on the theory of an affirmance of the contract or 
other transaction, a rescission is not a condition prece-
dent to maintaining an action to recover damages occa-
sioned by the fraud, nor need plaintiff, as a condition 
precedent, return or offer to return what he received." 
Accordingly, this portion of the complaint of Reliable 
must be examined independent of the claimed release. If, as 
Reliable alleges, the settlement was induced by the fraud and 
misrepresentation of defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover from the tort feasors the damages it suffered thereby: 
12 
The sums it would have recovered under the policy but for 
the fraud practiced upon it, less the actual amount received 
and plus any attendant damages it may prove. 
To review the elements set out supra, 
( 1) Herscovitz testified the representations relied upon 
were made by Day, vice-president of Western, (Western being 
general agent for American) and affirmed by Ball, agent of 
GAB. 
(2) Such statements obviously concerned a presently 
existing material fact, i.e., whether Reliable could obtain the 
$84,000 draft without settlement of the interruption policy. 
( 3) & ( 4) Day testified at trial he had no such instruc-
tions, establishing the falsity of the statements made. R 257. 
( 5) If the statements were made, it could have been sole-
ly for the purpose of inducing Reliable to settle for the $12,-
900 figure. 
(6), (7) & (8) Herscovitz testified he did believe Day's 
statements and relied upon them in accepting the settlement. 
(9) As set out in the Statement of Facts, the actual loss 
under the American policy was in the area of $128,000. 
Reliable does not contend the evidence produced entitles 
it to judgment as a matter of law. It does assert that at the 
close of its case, the trial court and this court must review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Reliable. Wells vs. 
Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 19 U. 2nd 89; 426 P2 229. In this 
light, the canvass of the transcript establishes the elements 
of fraud pleaded and proved and Reliable had the right to a 
jury verdict on these disputed issues. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Court has recognized in Finlaysen vs. Brady, 121 
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U. 204, 240 P2 491, the right to trial by jury is an ancient and 
valued right, not to be denied without compelling reasons. 
In determining the question, every controverted fact must 
be resolved in favor of the party against whom the motion is 
directed. Boskovitch vs. Utah Const. Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P2 
885. 
We think appellant has kept faith with the allegations 
of its complaint, and the representations made to this Court 
at the last hearing concerning the nature and quality of the 
evidence it relies upon. The mandate of Reliable (if the de-
cision ordering a new trial can be termed a mandate) has not 
been kept and appellant must again seek the aid of this Court. 
The relief sought is not extensive, simply the opportunity to 
have a jury pass upon the merits of the lawsuit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL of 
Olmstead, Stine and Campbell 
2324 Adams Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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